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The drive for more consistent eating quality has become a competitive strategy amongst UK food retailers to gain market share through improved margins and customer loyalty (IGD 2003), and has led to various attempts at marketing differentiated retail branded products sourced through retailer-led co-ordinated supply chains.  However, the economic benefits resulting from the success of own brands are offset by an increase in the level of risk for those retailers who invest in own brand products. The more detailed their requirements and instructions to their upstream suppliers, the more they are held responsible for the safety and quality of the end product by both regulators and consumers.  

In the UK, consumers have become increasingly concerned about food safety and quality issues, particularly those risks that have potentially severe consequences, and are little understood, such as vCJD.   UK retailers, particularly in relation to maintaining food quality and safety, therefore see supply chain management as crucial.

In recent years, similar attempts at supply chain co-ordination have also emerged in the catering industry, which in contrast to the retail channel, is highly fragmented ensuring that co-ordination amongst the different links along the supply chain is far more difficult to achieve.





The study discusses food safety and quality in terms of information asymmetry, and critiques Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Williamson 1989; Williamson 1993a); Williamson 1993b)), which has been used to examine the emergence of retailer-led vertically co-ordinated supply chains in the UK food industry (Hobbs, 1995, Henson and Northen, 1998).  The theory has been criticised in a number of areas by various authors (Doel, 1999, Hobbs, 1997, Demsetz 1993, McDonald 1999; McGuinness 1987, Ring, 1992, Dietrich 1994; Lazonick 1991), in particular the emergence of more complex governance structures other than market, hybrid and hierarchy.  





Research into vertically co-ordinated supply chains poses particular challenges for researchers, particularly access to, and subsequent co-operation from, all participants within a particular supply chain.  Additionally, the distinct nature and size of the population at various points along the supply chain demand that different research methods be designed and applied for each dyadic relationship.  For the purpose of this study, a three-stage research plan was developed, involving both exploratory and explanatory research.   As an initial step, exploratory interviews were held with representatives of stakeholders​[1]​ using a broad semi-structured interview guide, in order to gain an overview of the drivers and effects over time of changes in contractual relationships. Secondly, key industry players were contacted and interviewed using the more detailed semi-structured interview guide, which focused on identifying the elements of specific principal-agent contractual relationships, as identified in the theoretical model. 

The third stage of the research plan involved two case studies of complete co-ordinated supply chains operating in different sectors, examining the management of perceived risk through contractual relationships at each point, using different data collection methods according to the characteristics of each sector.  Data collection methods include semi-structured interviews, consumer focus groups and a mail survey or caterers.





By applying an Agency theoretical perspective to complete supply chains in the UK beef sector, the research responds to critics of Agency theory who note the lack of empirical work in organisations, and the narrow and static perspective of the theory (White, 1985; Hirsch, Michaels et al, 1987; Bowie and Freeman, 1992; Mitnick, 1992).    By integrating Agency theory with Perceived Risk Theory, the research has also responded to those critics of Agency theory who have called for integration with other perspectives in order to enrich the theory (Conlon and Parks, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1988, 1989; Hill and Jones, 1992; Hendry, 1997; Gibbons, 1998). The findings also contribute towards theory by demonstrating that asset specificity manages risk rather than adding to the hazards of contracting, therefore contributing to market success for both parties.  

By examining co-ordinated supply chains as a series of principal agent relationships, the case study findings provide evidence that both the previous dyad and the perception of risk influence contractual terms, including the incentives.  The development of own brand beef products can be viewed as a strategic reaction by retailers to consumers’ or catering customers’ perceived risk associated with the beef category.  Taking a ‘demand-driven’ perspective, organisational goals are derived from customer needs, and therefore the specification of the product and consequential contractual terms between retailer and processor, and processor and farmer, are designed to meet such goals and to reduce customers’ perceived risk associated with beef.  














^1	  Government, consumers, retailers, abattoirs, farmers.
